Abstract. It is known that propositional relevant logics can be conservatively extended by the addition of a Heyting (intuitionistic) implication connective. We show that this same conservativity holds for a range of first-order relevant logics with strong identity axioms, using an adaptation of Fine's stratified model theory. For systems without identity, the question of conservatively adding Heyting implication is thereby reduced to the question of conservatively adding the axioms for identity. Some results in this direction are also obtained. The conservative presence of Heyting implication allows the development of an alternative model theory for quantified relevant logics. §1. Introduction and overview. This paper shows that various systems of first-order logic with relevant implication can be conservatively extended by the addition of a Heyting implication. By the latter we mean a binary connective ⊃ that relates to the conjunction connective ∧ by the deduction principle
§1. Introduction and overview. This paper shows that various systems of first-order logic with relevant implication can be conservatively extended by the addition of a Heyting implication. By the latter we mean a binary connective ⊃ that relates to the conjunction connective ∧ by the deduction principle
of "∧-Residuation". In this context, a consecution relation A B asserts that the relevant implication A → B is a theorem. 1 Given some deduction system L, defined by specified axioms and rules in a particular language without ⊃, we call HL the system having those axioms and rules of L together with the rule (1.1), all stated for formulas in the expanded language containing ⊃. HL is called conservative over L if it has no new ⊃-free theorems: every ⊃-free formula that is a theorem of HL must already be an L-theorem.
We will prove that conservativity of HL over L holds when L is a certain extension of the Anderson-Belnap system RQ by axioms for an identity predicate ≈, as well for many subsystems of this one obtained by varying the underlying propositional axioms. These results are then extended to systems with contrapositive negation, by which we mean systems that may lack the double-negation elimination postulate ¬¬A → A, and in which the quantifiers ∀, ∃, and the propositional connectives ∧, ∨, →, ¬, • (fusion), are all independent. All of this requires new completeness theorems giving semantic characterizations of the logics involved. For the logics without double-negation elimination we use a binary incompatibility relation ⊥ to interpret negation, a modeling that goes back to an early paper of the author (Goldblatt, 1974) .
For all the systems just mentioned, the question of conservatively adding ⊃ is thereby reduced to the problem of conservatively adding axioms for identity. In the last part of the paper we give some results in this direction for the {∀, ∧, ∨, →, ¬, •}-fragment of many contrapositive-negation systems. The final Section 8 contains a full summary of all the semantic characterizations and conservativity results proved in the paper.
These results are not just a series of technical curiosities. The conservative presence of ⊃ has a significant impact on the properties of canonical models used in completeness proofs, and has allowed the development of a new kind of model theory for quantified relevant logics by adapting ideas from the Kripke-Joyal semantics for intuitionistic logic. Details of this will be reported elsewhere.
It is already known that ⊃ can be conservatively added to the propositional relevant logic R (and many of its subsystems). This observation is due to Restall (1998) , using a strikingly direct argument based on the completeness of R with respect to the relational models of Routley and Meyer (1973) . If a ⊃-free propositional formula A is not an R-theorem, then it is falsified by some Routley-Meyer model A. This model has a partial order ≥ that can be used to interpret ⊃ by Kripke's clause for satisfaction of intuitionistic implication:
(
1.2)
A is thereby expanded to a model A for the language including ⊃. The interpretation of A is unchanged, so A still falsifies A. It suffices then to show that A is an HR-model, in order to conclude that A is not an HR-theorem. The clause (1.2) ensures that (1.1) is sound in A , so the issue comes down to the A -soundness of the axioms and rules of R in the extended language. For this we need the general fact that the truth relation is extendable along the ordering ≥, in the sense that for any formula B, t | B and u ≥ t implies u | B.
(1.3)
Now (1.3) is shown by induction on the formation of B, with the inductive cases for the R-connectives being just as in Routley and Meyer (1973) , and the inductive case that B is B 1 ⊃ B 2 following directly from (1.2) by transitivity of ≥, as is well known. That completes the conservativity proof. 2 This argument suggests that a similar proof should work for the first-order logic RQ, by invoking its completeness with respect to the partially ordered stratified models of Fine (1988) . But here there is an obstacle, concerning the proof that the expanded structure A is an RQ-model. Soundness of the quantifier axioms depends, not just on the ≥-extendability of truth (1.3), but on several other results proven by induction on formula formation. Two of these, the Truth Across and Truth Down lemmas, are problematic for the inductive case of ⊃.
It turns out that Truth Down can be handled by introducing an additional property of stratified models, concerning the down operator t → t↓. This property states that u ≥ t↓ implies ∃u + ≥ t (u + ↓ = u), (1.4) and makes ↓ into a p-morphism relative to ≥, leading to a verification that t↓ | B ⊃ C iff t | B ⊃ C. Canonical models for RQ and related logics can be shown to satisfy (1.4) with the help of the Conjunctive Existential Distribution postulate
A ∧ ∃x B → ∃x(A ∧ B),
where x is not free in A, and without any use of ⊃ (see Theorem 4.2 below). Truth Across, however, does not seem amenable to such a strategy. To explain this, note that a point t in a stratified model can be intuitively thought of as a theory, a collection of propositions closed under whatever those propositions commit one to, or perhaps as a collection of sentences closed under entailment. Each theory has a domain of individuals over which quantified variables range. Given distinct individuals i, j in the domain of t, there is a theory i j t ("t across"), thought of as the minimal extension of t in which i and j are treated as logically indistinguishable. If t = i j t, then t is called i j-symmetric. The Truth Across Lemma asserts that if t is i j-symmetric, then t | A iff t | A , where A is any sentence obtained from A by interchanging some occurrences of the constants i and j. But for this to hold inductively when A is B ⊃ C, it would seem to be required that i jsymmetry be preserved by ≥-extension, that is that if u ≥ t = i j t, then u = i j u. It is not evident that this condition can be imposed on general stratified RQ-models.
However, this condition can be imposed for languages that have an identity predicate ≈, producing sentences i ≈ j in the object language asserting the indistinguishability of i and j. If we require that models satisfy
then ≥-extendability of truth ensures ≥-extendability of i j-symmetry, allowing the Truth Across Lemma to be proved for the case of ⊃. We use a semantics for identity adapting that of Mares (1992) , interpreting ≈ as a binary relation ≈ t on the domain of individuals associated with each theory t. The resulting logic is axiomatized as a system RQ ≈ that has HRQ ≈ as a conservative extension.
There is a subtle technicality in our analysis that is worth pointing out from the outset, since it determines the nature of our canonical model constructions and choice of axioms. The stratified models of Fine (1988) admit empty theories containing no propositions and making no commitments. In particular, in the canonical models used in completeness proofs, at each level of the stratification there is a ≥-minimum element satisfying no sentences. These minima are co-theories of ≥-maximum elements that themselves satisfy all sentences. Now an empty theory would be i j-symmetric but not satisfy i ≈ j, so would violate (1.5). Therefore we have to eliminate such elements. At the same time we need to keep the maximum elements, as these may be produced by the fusion t · u of two theories t and u, an operation used to model relevant implication. But then we have to remove the maximum elements from the domain of the co-theory function, this domain being the set of saturated theories. Thus we do not count maximum theories as saturated, so the whole canonical model construction of Fine (1988) has to be adapted to work under this restriction.
This adaptation requires us to include as axioms the schemas A → v ≈ v (corresponding to reflexivity of all relations ≈ t ) and v ≈ v → (v ≈ v → A). The first ensures that all self-identity statements are provably equivalent:
v ≈ v ↔ w ≈ w. These axioms appear to violate the principle of relevance of implication. But a liberal relevantism might concede that an assertion v ≈ v of self-identity is equivalent to the "Verum" T, a weakest proposition that is true if any proposition is, while its negation v ≈ v is equivalent to the "Falsum" F, a strongest proposition implying all others. A theory that treats self-identity literally is committed to the presence of formulas that play the role of T and F. In any case, models satisfying (1.5) validate the axioms A → v ≈ v and v ≈ v → (v ≈ v → A), as we show in Corollary 3.2, and these axioms are in turn needed to axiomatize the logic of such models.
Here is a brief summary of the paper. Section 2 reviews Fine's stratified models and the logics they characterize. Section 3 introduces the identity axioms and their models, and gives completeness theorems for logics with these axioms by a canonical model construction. Section 4 gives a semantic analysis of the Conjunctive Existential Distribution postulate, and Section 5 proves the conservativity of Heyting implication over the identity logics of Section 3. Section 6 reworks the whole theory for logics with weaker negation under the ⊥ interpretation. Section 7 uses algebraic semantics and the ideal-completion of an algebraic model to give conservativity results for adding identity, and for adding Heyting implication, to certain logics with weak negation. Section 8 catalogues all the semantic characterizations and conservativity results shown in the paper. §2. Stratified models and their logics. Familiarity is assumed with the papers (Fine, 1974 (Fine, , 1988 ), which will be followed closely, and will be referred to as MFE and SQL. First we review the semantics of SQL, which is based on L-structures, where L is some set of predicates. These structures have the form
fulfilling the following description:
(i) T (theories) is a set, with members denoted by the letters t, u, v, as well as decorations of these like t + , t , t * , and so forth. (ii) S (saturated theories) is a subset of T , with members denoted by a, b, c, as well as a + , a , and so forth. (iii) D (relative domain) is a function from T to sets, taking each t ∈ T to its ontology or domain of individuals D t . We use D (domains) for {D t : t ∈ T }, and I for D. The members of I may be thought of as constants, so the members of D represent various levels of language differing only in the constants they contain. We write α, β, γ for members of D, and i, j, k for members of I . The domain equivalence relation ≡ is defined to be
Thus members of the equivalence class {u : t ≡ u} all have the same level. 3 (iv) l (logics) is a function from D to T , with D l(α) = α. l(α) is thought of as the logic appropriate to α. Often this is written just as l, with the α omitted. (v) · (fusion) is a partial binary operation on T , with t · u defined only when t ≡ u, and having t · u ≡ t ≡ u. Usually t · u is written tu. (vi) − (the co-theory operation) is a unary operation on S, having −a ≡ a. We may write t − a for t · −a. (vii) ≥ is a binary relation on T , with t ≥ u only if t ≡ u. The converse of ≥ is written ≤. (viii) ↑ (the up operator) is a partial function from T × D to T , with ↑(t, α) defined only when D t ⊆ α and having D ↑(t,α) = α. Usually ↑(t, α) is written t↑ α , or just as t↑ if no ambiguity results. It may be thought of as the expansion of theory t to α, the consequences in the language of α of the theorems of t. We also write t↑ u for t↑ Du . (ix) ↓ (the down operator) is a partial function from T × D to T , with ↓(t, α) defined only when α ⊆ D t and having D ↓(t,α) = α. Usually ↓(t, α) is written t↓ α , or just as t↓ if no ambiguity results. It may be thought of as the contraction of theory t to α, the theorems of t that belong to the language of α. We also write t↓ u for t↓ Du . (x) → (the across operator) is a partial function from T × {{i, j} ⊆ I : i = j} into T .
→(t, {i, j}) is defined for i = j just in case i, j ∈ D t , and is ≡-equivalent to t. It is usually written i j t, or just t if no ambiguity results. An element of the form i j t is said to be i j-symmetric. Note that i j t = ji t.
(xi) ϕ (valuation) is a relation holding between a theory t ∈ T and an (n + 1)-tuple (R, i 1 , . . . , i n ) consisting of an n-ary predicate R ∈ L and individuals i 1 , . . . , i n from D t .
Such a structure will be called a stratified model if it satisfies the following conditions (remember that t, u, v ∈ T while a, b, c ∈ S):
II. Levels
(i) ∀α∃β(α ⊂ β). (ii) ∀α, β ∃γ (α ∪ β ⊆ γ ). (iii) ∀α, β, γ (α ⊆ β ⊆ γ implies α ∪ (γ − β) ∈ D).
III. Behavior of ↑ and ↓
(i) (a) t ≤ u implies t↑ ≤ u↑. (b) t ≤ u implies t↓ ≤ u↓. (ii) (a) t↑↑ = t↑ (b) t↓↓ = t↓. (iii) (a) t↑↓ = t. (b) t↓↑ ≤ t. (c) t↓↑ = t↑↓, as long as D t ∩ D t↓↑ = D t↓ . (iv) ϕt↓(R, i 1 , . . . , i n ) iff ϕt (R, i 1 , . . . , i n ), for i 1 , . . . , i n ∈ D t↓ .
IV. Interaction of ↑ and ↓
(iv) t = i j t and t ≤ a implies ∃a (a = i j a and t ≤ a ≤ a).
Explanation and interpretation of these conditions are given in SQL.
We now explain how a model interprets L-formulas, constructed from a given set L of predicates by the connectives ∧, ¬, and → and the universal quantifier ∀. The disjunction A ∨ B is defined to be ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B), and ∃x to be ¬∀x¬. A typographical distinction is made between free and bound (or bindable) individual variables. We assume an infinite supply of real variables v, w, and an infinite supply of apparent variables x, y. Real variables are never bound by ∀, so occur only freely. Apparent variables can have both free and bound occurrences. A real formula is one which has no free occurrence of an apparent variable, that is all apparent occurrences are bound, and so any free occurrences are real. We write Var(A) for the set of real variables occurring in A, and if V is a set of real variables, let Fml(V ) be the set of real formulas A for which Var(A) ⊆ V .
The notation A(ξ/ ) will be used for the formula resulting from replacement of every free occurrence of the variable in A by ξ . If ξ is an apparent variable, this notation is used on the understanding that ξ is free for in A, that is no free occurrence of in A is within the scope of ∀ξ .
The individuals I of a stratified model A are added as self-designating names to L to form L I . For an L I -formula A, let I (A) = {i ∈ I : i occurs in A}, and say that A is defined at the point t of A if I (A) ⊆ D t . We call A a sentence if it has no free variables, that is A may contain members of I as self-naming constants, but has no occurrences of real variables, and only bound occurrences of apparent variables. Let Sen(t) be the set of all L I -sentences that are defined at t in A.
DEFINITION 2.1. The truth relation | is defined to hold between theories t of A and sentences of Sen(t) by the clauses
. . , v n ) with real variables v 1 , . . . , v n is true in A if for any i 1 , . . . , i n ∈ I , and any l at which
A real L-formula is valid in a class of stratified models if it is true in every member of the class.
Using the definition of ∃x as ¬∀x¬, it is shown in [SQL, Lemma 10] that
(2.1)
Axioms and rules for a system BQ are listed in Figure 1 . A logic is defined to be any set L of real formulas that includes all real instances of these axioms and is closed under the rules. If A ∈ L, we may write L A (for "A is an L-theorem"). BQ itself is the smallest logic. A quasi-logic includes all the axioms but need only be closed under the first five rules, and not under generalization.
A model A may be said to validate an axiom if all instances of this axiom are true in A. A rule is valid in A if all instances of the rule preserve truth in A.
We use the term postulate to mean either an axiom or a rule. Figure 2 contains additional standard postulates and corresponding structure conditions [SQL, p. 58] . If X is any set of these postulates, let BQX be the smallest logic closed under all members of X. RQ is the smallest logic containing all postulates, and EQ the smallest containing all but the last (Assertion) postulate.
It is shown in SQL that BQX is characterized by the class of all stratified models that satisfy all the conditions corresponding to the postulates in X. In other words, a real formula is a theorem of BQX iff it is valid in this class of models. The proof involves constructing a canonical model that satisfies the conditions corresponding to X while falsifying all non-theorems of BQX. BQ itself is characterized by the class of all models, while RQ is characterized by the class of all models satisfying all the conditions listed in Figure 2 . Note that the last condition amounts to commutativity of fusion. 4 The soundness parts of these characterizations depend on some lemmas, proven by induction on the length of formulas, that hold in any stratified model. These will be stated now. For this we call a sentence A an i j-variant of A if it is obtained from A by arbitrarily interchanging some occurrences of i and j. For example, the i j-variants of Ri j are Rii, Ri j, R ji, and R j j. From these results follow certain facts that are used for proving soundness and validity: (1) a | ¬B iff −a | B, where B ∈ Sen(a).
REMARK 2.4 (THE ROLE OF IV(I)(C)). In SQL the condition IV(i)(c) is stated with the stronger conclusion ∃a + ≥ t (a + ↓ = a), but the proof given of IV(i)(c) in the canonical model only shows the weaker condition a + ↓ ≤ a. However this weaker conclusion is all that is needed for the role that IV(i)(c) plays, which is to ensure that the Truth Down Lemma holds for inductive case of A = ¬B, as can be readily checked [SQL, p. 41] .
On the other hand, given IV(i)(c) as stated here, the stronger version can be derived by using IV(i)(b). For if a + ≥ t and a + ↓ ≤ a, then −a ≤ (−a + )↓ (by I(vi) and IV(ii)), so by IV(i)(b) there exists a ≤ −a + with a ↓ = −a. Putting a * = −a , it can then be shown that a * ≥ t and a * ↓ = a. Now the role of IV(i)(b) is to ensure the soundness of the Disjunctive ∀-Distribution axiom [SQL, p. 50] , while this axiom is used just to show that canonical models satisfy IV(i)(b) [SQL, . In other words, this axiom corresponds exactly to IV(i)(b).
The upshot of this discussion is that by stating IV(i)(c) in the weaker form given here, the condition IV(i)(b) can be dropped to obtain a complete semantics for logics that do not include the Disjunctive ∀-Distribution axiom.
Further discussion of IV(i)(c) is given in Section 4.
Conservatively adding τ τ τ .
The presence of the model elements l(α) makes it natural to enrich the language with a sentential constant τ τ τ having the semantics
where l here is l(D t ). The cases A = τ τ τ of the Truth Extension, Across and Down lemmas are then readily derived (Truth Down uses II(i)(a,b), III(iii)(a), and IV(iv), showing among other things that l↓ = l ). Truth Saturation follows from the additional structural condition
For any logic L, the canonical L-model of [SQL] satisfies this condition. The points in such a model are pairs t = ( , V ) with V a finite set of real variables, and a subset of
The members of S are those points for which is a prime L-theory in Fml(V ).
Thus if t l, there is some formula
Lindenbaum's Lemma then provides a prime L-theory in Fml(V ) with ⊆ and A / ∈ . Then a = ( , V ) has a ≥ t and a l, verifying I(viii).
To axiomatize logics with τ τ τ under this semantics requires two new postulates. Let BQX τ τ τ be the logic defined by the axioms and rules for BQ and the postulates from X, all stated for formulas of the language with τ τ τ , together with τ τ τ itself as an axiom, and the inference rule A τ τ τ → A .
Completeness for BQX τ τ τ is then shown by handling the τ τ τ case as in [MFE, p. 359] .
The following argument, sketched in the Introduction, exemplifies the way we use stratified models to prove conservativity results. Proof. Let B be a τ τ τ -free formula that is not a BQX-theorem. We have to show that B is not a BQX τ τ τ -theorem. From the above remarks, there is a model A for the τ τ τ -free language that satisfies I(viii) and whose truth relation | has A | BQX but A | B.
Define a new truth relation | on A for the language including τ τ τ , by putting t | τ τ τ iff l ≤ t, for all t ∈ T , and otherwise defining | by exactly the same conditions as for | given in Definition 2.1. Then an inductive proof shows that any τ τ τ -free formula A has
It remains then to show that A | BQX τ τ τ to obtain our desired result. It is straightforward to check that A | τ τ τ , and A | A only if A | τ τ τ → A. Thus we are left to check that the axioms and rules of BQX are sound in A under | . But this follows exactly as in [SQL] , since the Truth Lemmas 2.2 all hold with | in place of | . These lemmas are proven by induction on the length of a formula A. When A is τ τ τ , the lemmas hold as indicated above. The other cases of A are just as in [SQL] , so this completes the argument. §3. Logics with identity. Assume from now on that the language includes τ τ τ , that any logic considered has the postulates for τ τ τ just described, and that all models satisfy I(viii). Next we add a new binary predicate ≈. Call a formula A a vw-variant of A if it is obtained from A by arbitrary interchange of some occurrences of the real variables v and w. Then the axioms for identity that we need are
The last two of these can be derived from the others in some logics, as will be explained later (see Remarks 3.6 and 6.9).
Note that by Modus Ponens, v ≈ v is derivable from I1 (just let A be any theorem), and
The definition of a structure A for this language remains as before, on the understanding that the valuation relation ϕt (R, i 1 , . . . , i n ) now includes the case that R is ≈ and n = 2. For each t ∈ T we define a binary relation ≈ t on D t by putting i ≈ t j iff ϕt (≈, i, j) . A stratified identity model is a structure that satisfies the conditions I-V as before, and also the following:
The definition of the truth relation | remains as in Definition 2.1. In particular, for an identity sentence i ≈ j we get that
Since the new identity predicate ≈ behaves like other predicates in satisfying I(vii), III(iv), and V(ix), the proofs of the Truth Lemmas 2.2 hold for this language with identity, just as in SQL.
LEMMA 3.1.
Proof.
(1) This is really a manifestation of Truth Extension for identities, but we give the details ab initio.
COROLLARY 3.2. The identity axioms I1-I4 are valid in stratified identity models.
Proof. From Lemma 3.1(2) it follows that t | i ≈ i for any i ∈ D t , so a self-identity sentence can never be falsified at any point in such a model. Consequently, no sentence of the form A → i ≈ i can be falsified, ensuring that axiom I1 is valid. In particular, i ≈ i → i ≈ i can never be falsified, ensuring the validity of I3.
For I2, if A is an i j-variant of sentence A ∈ Sen(t), and We turn now to completeness theorems for logics with identity. If L is a quasi-logic, we write L B, and say that B is L-deducible from the set of formulas , if there exists an L-deduction of B from , that is a finite sequence of formulas A 0 , . . . , A n such that A n = B and for all m ≤ n,
. This is equivalent to requiring that there exist members
We assume properties of this deducibility relation shown in [MFE, SQL] 
proper if there is some formula not in ; and L-saturated if it is an L-prime and proper L-theory. In general, {B :
L B} is the least L-theory including the set , and if is closed under conjunction, then this is just {B : ∃A ∈ (A L B)}.
Lindenbaum's Lemma. If is a set of formulas closed under disjunction, and is an L-theory that does not intersect , then has an L-prime extension that does not intersect . If
The first sentence of this result is proved as in [MFE, , and the second follows immediately, since = ∅ implies is proper. As a special case we have:
If is an L-theory and A / ∈ , then has a proper L-prime extension not containing A.
Recall that Fml(V ) is the set of formulas A whose set Var(A) of real variables is included in V . The above notions and results relativize to Fml(V ). (
Proof. (1) implies (2): by the Deduction Theorem. (2) implies (3): an induction on proofs is used to show that
An L-V -theory is defined to be a pair t = ( , V ) with a nonempty L-theory in V . We write Thm(t) for and
Then t|U is an L-U -theory. When V ⊆ U , t|U is the expansion of t to U , and is the least L-theory in U that includes Thm(t). When U ⊆ V , t|U is the contraction of t to U , in which case Thm(t|U ) = {A ∈ Thm(t) :
The canonical model A L for the logic L has the following structure [SQL, p. 53]:
and u is the expansion of t to α}.
(ix) ↓ = {(t, α, u) : t, u ∈ T, ∅ = α ⊆ Var(t), and u is the contraction of t to α}.
Proof. The proof that A L satisfies the conditions of groups I-V is essentially as in [MEF, SQL] , except that those papers did not require, as we do here, that Thm(t) be nonempty, and that it be a proper subset of Fml(Var(t)) when t is saturated. So we need to check those points where these requirements need to be verified.
First we need to verify that the operations on A L are well-defined. Note that if t ∈ T , then there exists some A ∈ Thm(t), so by axiom I1 we get v ≈ v ∈ Thm(t) for each v ∈ Var(t). Hence axiom I3 yields
Now let a ∈ S. We need to check that the prime theory Thm(−a) = {B : ¬B / ∈ Thm(a)} is nonempty and proper, hence saturated. Now Thm(a) is proper, so there is some A ∈ Fml(Var(a)) − Thm(a). But the Double-Negation Elimination axiom yields ¬¬A / ∈ Thm(a), so ¬A ∈ Thm(−a). Also there exists a B ∈ Thm(a), and L B → ¬¬B, so ¬¬B ∈ Thm(a), and so ¬B / ∈ Thm(−a). For the up operator, if t ∈ T and Var(t) ⊆ α, then Thm(t) ⊆ Thm(t↑ α ), so Thm(t↑ α ) is nonempty because Thm(t) is. Similarly for the across operator, as Thm(t) ⊆ Thm( t ).
For the down operator, if v ∈ α ⊆ Var(t), then v ≈ v ∈ Thm(t↓ α ). Actually, it is not necessary to use properties of identity to show Thm(t↓ α ) = ∅. For if B ∈ Thm(t), and
The points from conditions I-V that need checking are as follows.
Then is closed under disjunction [MFE, p. 354] , and is disjoint from Thm(t). Hence by Lindenbaum's Lemma there exists a extending Thm(t) that is L-prime in V and disjoint from . But Thm(a) is proper and Thm(u) is nonempty, so taking any C ∈ Fml(V ) − Thm(a) and B ∈ Thm(u) gives B → C ∈ . Hence = ∅, so is proper and nonempty, and b = ( , V ) is saturated, hence in S, with a ≥ bu. Also we want that ∃b ≥ u (a ≥ tb). Here we use the identity axiom I4. Let
Again is closed under disjunction and disjoint from Thm(t). Take any B ∈ Fml(V ) − Thm(a) and v ∈ V . Then v ≈ v ∈ Thm(t), so by I4, (v = v → B) ∈ Thm(t), giving v = v ∈ . So = ∅, and again we obtain a b = ( , V ) ∈ S as desired with a prime extension of Thm(t) disjoint from .
, then there is a prime extension of Thm(t) with
IV(i)(a):
We want a↓ to be in S whenever a ∈ S. Now Thm(a↓) will be a prime L-theory in Var(a↓) when Thm(a) is a a prime L-theory in Var(a), and nonempty when Thm(a) is nonempty as shown above. The new point is that Thm(a↓) is proper. But there exists A / ∈ Thm(a), and if Var(a) − Var(a↓) = {v 1 , . . . , v n } then taking fresh variables x 1 , . . . , x n , the formula ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n A(x 1 /v 1 , . . . , x n /v n ) is not in Thm(a) by the specification axiom, but is in Fml(Var(a↓)), so is not in Thm(a↓).
IV(i)(b):
Let a ≤ b↓. We need an a + ≤ b with a + ↓ = a. This is constructed in [SQL] in the form A + = ( + , Var(b)), where + is a prime theory in Var(b) that extends the expansion of a to Var(b) and is disjoint from , where in turn is the closure under disjunction of
But [Fml(Var(a) ) − Thm(a)] is nonempty, since Thm(a) is proper, so is nonempty, making + proper as required.
IV(i)(c):
Let a ≥ t↓. To construct a + = ( + , Var(t)) with a + ≥ t and a + ↓ ≤ a, let Thm(a) = Fml(Var(a)) − Thm(a). Then Thm(t) is disjoint from Thm(a), which is closed under disjunction as Thm(a) is prime in Var(a). Hence Thm(t) extends to the desired L-theory + that is L-prime in Var(t) and disjoint from Thm(a). But Thm(a) = ∅, as Thm(a) is proper, hence + is proper, and a + ∈ S as required.
V(iv):
If t is vw-symmetric and t ≤ a ∈ S, then [SQL, p. 56] constructs a vw-symmetric object a such that t ≤ a ≤ a and Thm(a ) is an L vw -prime L vw -theory in Var(t). But then Thm(a ) is proper in Var(t), as Thm(a ) ⊆ Thm(a) and Thm(a) is proper, so a ∈ S as required.
That completes the review of properties I-V. For VI(i), suppose that v ≈ t w, that is ϕt (≈, v, w), which means in A L that v ≈ w ∈ Thm(t). We want to show t = t, where → is vw→. The argument is similar to Mares (1992, Lemma 6.2) . First, from axiom I2, Thm(t) is closed under vw-variants, that is if A is a vw-variant of A ∈ Thm(t), then v ≈ w ∧ A ∈ Thm(t), and so from I2, A ∈ Thm(t). Now if B ∈ Thm( t ), there exists A ∈ Thm(t) with
is an L-theory, and so finally B ∈ Thm(t) as B is a vw-variant of B(v/w). Hence Thm( t ) = Thm(t) as required.
Conversely, suppose t = t.
Let BQX τ τ τ ≈ be the logic in the language with τ τ τ and ≈ that is defined by the axioms and rules for BQ, the postulates from X, the postulates for τ τ τ , and the identity axioms I1-I4. Proof. Soundness has already been discussed. For completeness, let L= BQX τ τ τ ≈ , and suppose B is a real formula with L B. The stratified identity model A L satisfies the structure conditions corresponding to X, hence validates L, so it suffices to show A L | B.
Now the real variables can be regarded as self-designating names for the individuals in A L , and so any real formula A can be subject to the truth relation t | A in A L when Var(A) ⊆ Var(t). The Canonical Truth Lemma states that in A L ,
This is proven as in [SQL, Lemma 17] . The only new case here is when A is an atomic identity, but this holds just as for any other atomic formula, and indeed was indicated above:
REMARK 3.6 (THE ROLE OF AXIOM I4). I4 has been used only to prove that the canonical model A L satisfies the second part of condition I(iii), that is that a ≥ tu implies ∃b ≥ u (a ≥ tb). The first part of I(iii), that a ≥ tu implies ∃b ≥ t (a ≥ bu), was shown without any use of identity axioms. But if the fusion operation is commutative, that is tu = ut, then the second part of I(iii) follows from the first. Thus for logics containing the Assertion axiom A → (( A → B) → B) (see last line of Figure 2 ), we do not need I4, and can carry through the completeness proof for identity systems by using only I1-I3.
It must follow that in such systems, I4 is derivable from the other axioms. Indeed, from Assertion we can derive the Permutation rule
But the schema v ≈ v → B is derivable from I1 using Double-Negation Elimination. In particular we can derive v ≈ v → (v ≈ v → A), from which I4 follows by the Permutation rule.
For logics in which I3 is derivable, and further information about the role of I4, see Remark 6.9. §4. The structural role of conjunctive existential distribution. Figure 3 lists postulates involving the existential quantifier that are derivable in BQ. Their derivation depends on Double-Negation Elimination and the definition of ∃x as ¬∀x¬. But in Section 6 we will consider logics in which Double-Negation Elimination is not present, and ∃ is primitive. A semantics for ∃ will be given that validates the Existence axiom and the ∃-Elimination rule. Validity of Conjunctive ∃-Distribution will require the new structural condition
It is noteworthy that in the presence of IV(i)(d), the condition
implies the stronger IV(i)(c) : a ≥ t↓ implies ∃a + ≥ t (a + ↓ = a) that was discussed earlier in Remark 2.4. For if a ≥ t↓, then from IV(i)(d) we get some u ≥ t with u↓ = a, and then as a ≥ u↓, from IV(i)(c) we get some a + ≥ u with a + ↓ ≤ a. But now a + ≥ t, and a + ↓ ≥ u↓ = a, hence a + ↓ = a.
Canonical models for BQ and related logics can be shown to satisfy IV(i)(d). We now give a proof of this whose only quantifier-related prerequisites are the postulates of Figure 3 . Hence this proof is available for logics having these postulates with ∃ primitive. 
Proof. We use the principle that if x is not in C, then L C → ∃xC(x/v), by the Existence axiom as [C(x/v)](v/x) is just C. The proofs are by induction on n. (1) Let B n = ∃x n . . . (A ∧ B(x 1 /v 1 , . . . , x n /v n )), the left and right sides of (2). Then 
Then + is an L-theory in V + with ∪ ⊆ + and ⊆ + ∩ Fml(V ). We prove the converse of this last inclusion.
Let C ∈ + ∩ Fml(V ). Then ∪ L C, so as the theories and are closed under conjunction, then either there exists A ∈ with L A → C; or there exists B ∈ with L B → C; or there exists A ∈ and B ∈ with L A ∧ B → C. We take the last case first.
Let V + − V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, and take new x 1 , . . . , x n not occurring in A, B, C. Since
. Then L A ∧ B * → C by Lemma 4.1(2) and the last result. Now B ∈ , and L B → B * by Lemma 4.1(1), so B * ∈ ∩ Fml(V ) ⊆ . We now have A, B * ∈ , and L A ∧ B * → C, giving C ∈ as required because C ∈ Fml(V ).
In the case L A → C with A ∈ , then we get C ∈ immediately. If however we have L B → C with B ∈ , then L B * → C follows directly by ∃-Elimination, and again C ∈ .
This establishes that + ∩ Fml(V ) = . Putting u + = ( + , V + ), we then get u + ≥ t and u + ↓ V = u.
Note that in this proof, since ⊆ + , we get Thm(u + ) = ∅ if Thm(t) = ∅, as required for the canonical models of the identity systems of Section 3. Thus all the logics BQX τ τ τ ≈ , as well as the BQX's, are characterized by models satisfying the condition IV(i)(d). We will assume this condition in the next section. §5. Conservatively adding ⊃. The language with τ τ τ and ≈ will now be expanded further to include a new binary connective ⊃. Let A be a stratified identity model with truth relation | for the language without ⊃. Assume that A satisfies IV(i)(d). Define a new truth relation | on A for the language including ⊃, by inductively putting Proof. By the method used to prove Theorem 2.5. Let L= BQX τ τ τ ≈ , and suppose B is a ⊃-free formula such that L B. By Theorem 3.5, there is a (canonical) stratified identity model A satisfying the structure conditions for X, and having A | B. We can assume A satisfies IV(i)(d) (Theorem 4.2). Extend | as above to a relation | on A for the language including ⊃.
Given that A satisfies the structure conditions for X, and the Truth Lemmas all hold in (A, | ) for the expanded language (Lemma 5.1), earlier soundness arguments apply to show that all postulates of BQX τ τ τ ≈ are sound in (A, | ). In addition, the residuation rules are sound: it is readily shown, with the help of Corollary 2.3(4) especially, that
But any ⊃-free formula A has t | A iff t | A, and hence A | B. Therefore HBQX τ τ τ ≈ B as required. §6. Antitone and contrapositive negation. Points of a model may be thought of as states containing certain information, with t | A meaning that t contains the information that A. There is an informational interpretation of negation that takes t | ¬ A to mean that only states "incompatible" with t contain the information that A, or equivalently that no state compatible with t contains this information (Dunn, 1993) . Then t | ¬¬ A asserts that any state compatible with t is compatible with a state containing the information that A. It is not clear that it should follow that t itself contains the information that A, so this interpretation apparently does not validate Double-Negation Elimination.
In this section our results will be extended to logics that lack Double-Negation Elimination. Here it is no longer appropriate to use negation to define ∨ or ∃, so all of τ τ τ , ∧, ∨, ¬, →, ∀, and ∃ will be taken as primitive, and we need new semantics for ∨, ¬, and ∃. In addition, a primitive binary connective • (fusion) will be added, to be interpreted via the operation t · u in structures. The co-theory function is dropped in favor of a binary incompatibility relation ⊥ which is used to model ¬ in a manner first introduced in Goldblatt (1974) .
A structure now has the form
with the function − : S → S replaced by a binary relation ⊥ on T such that t ⊥ u implies t ≡ u.
The structural conditions on a model are adapted as follows:
I. Standard: (v) and (vi), which refer to −, are replaced by
Also we add
II. Levels: (iii) is strengthened to
(iii) ∀α, β, γ (α ∪ (γ − β) ∈ D).
IV. Interaction of ↑ and ↓ : (ii) is replaced by
(ii) (With ⊥)
IV(i)(b) is withdrawn:
it can be optionally added for logics that have Disjunctive ∀-Distribution. IV(i)(d) is also withdrawn: it can be optionally added for logics that have Conjunctive ∃-Distribution.
V. Behavior of → : (v) is replaced by (v) t ⊥ u implies t ⊥ u,
and (vi) is strengthened to
All other model conditions remain unchanged. We will call a structure satisfying these modified conditions for groups I-V an MQ-model. Here MQ refers to a logic to be defined below, and the "M" is for "minimal". Note that the new V(x) can be strengthened to an equality: using III(iii)(a), V(vii), III(iii)(b), and the monotonicity of ( ) and ↓, we get
The truth relation | on a model of this kind is defined by the previous clauses for atomic sentences, ∧, →, and ∀, and the new
In the clause for ∃ it is implicit that D a ⊆ D u . This complex clause seems to be required to derive the Truth Lemmas, especially the "up" direction of Truth Down for ∃. But once these are established, we will show, in Corollary 6.2, that the clause is equivalent to the simpler and more intuitive (2.1).
LEMMA 6.1. The Truth Lemmas 2.2 hold for any sentence A in the present language under the truth relation in an MQ-model.
Proof. It is a general fact that if a condition θ(t) is defined by, or equivalent to, one of the form (∀a ≥ t) ψ(a/t), then it satisfies Extension: θ(t) and t ≤ u implies θ(u/t); and Saturation: (∀a ≥ t) θ(a/t) implies θ(t). Thus Truth Extension and Truth Saturation hold when A has any of the forms B ∨ C, B • C, and ∃x B, just by the way truth is defined for these cases. We consider the remaining new cases in turn.
Truth 
But using the new V(x),
Truth Saturation: The only case left unresolved is A = ¬B. Suppose that (∀a ≥ t) (a | ¬B). If u ≡ t and u | B, then (∀a ≥ t) (a ⊥ u) by the semantics of ¬, so t ⊥ u by the new I(vi) . This proves t | ¬B, as required. Using Truth Extension, results (2)- (4) (Figure 3) are not included in MQ. The effect of adding these two distribution principles to MQ will be considered below (see especially Remark 6.8 and its preceding two paragraphs, as well as part (2) of the summary in Section 8).
A logic for the present language is a set L of real formulas closed under the postulates of Figure 4 . A quasi-logic has all of these postulates except the rules of Generalization and ∃-Elimination. MQ is the smallest logic.
(2) The Fusion-Residuation rules together are equivalent, over the postulates for relevant implication, to the combination of the schemas
with the Fusion-Monotonicity rule
(1): By the Conjunction Elimination axioms and the Antitonicity rule,
The general case of n is left to the reader. 
Proof. Using (2)-(4) of Corollary 2.3, it is straightforward to verify that the Disjunction axioms are valid under the present semantics. We go through the verification for the other additional axioms.
Antintonicity axiom: Let A → B be true in a model A. Existence axiom: Let real formula B have the form A(v/x) → ∃x A. We have to show that every sentence obtained by specifying the values of the real variables of B to be particular constants from I is true in A. We may suppose that all such variables except v are already specified. So we take any designated point l of A, and show that
in both cases we get the formula resulting from replacing all occurrences of x and v in A by i.
by Truth Extension, and u↓ a ≤ a, which verifies that t | ∃x A(i/v) by Corollary 6.2(2).
∃-Elimination rule: Let real formula A → B be true in A, with v its only real variable, and v not in B. Let the sentence ∃x A(x/v) → B be defined at t, and suppose t | ∃x A(x/v). Then by Corollary 6.2(2), given any a ≥ t there exist u and i ∈ D u with 
That concludes the proof of (1). For (2), suppose A ∧ ∃x B ∈ Sen(t) and t | A ∧ ∃x B. 
This ensures t | ∃x(A ∧ B). Thus IV(i)(d) guarantees that A ∧ ∃x B → ∃x(A ∧ B) is true in A when x is not free in A.
To prove completeness, we associate with each logic L a canonical model A L by the constructions of Section 3. The one change we need to make is to replace the co-theory function by a binary relation t ⊥ u. This is to hold only when Var(t) = Var(u), and for such t, u is defined by
Proof. We verify that A L satisfies all the new MQ-model conditions. I(v) : if u ≥ t and t ⊥ v, there is some A ∈ Thm(v) with ¬A ∈ Thm(t). But Thm(t) ⊆ Thm(u), so ¬A ∈ Thm(u), showing u ⊥ v.
I(vi) : Suppose (∀a ≥ t) (a ⊥ u). We want t ⊥ u. Let be the closure under disjunction of the set {¬ A : A ∈ Thm(u)}. It suffices to show that Thm(t) ∩ = ∅. For if ¬A 1 ∨ · · ·∨¬A n ∈ Thm(t) with A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ Thm(u), then using Lemma 6.3(1) we get ¬(A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n ) ∈ Thm(t), so as A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n ∈ Thm(u) we get t ⊥ u as desired. But if we had Thm(t) ∩ = ∅, then as is closed under disjunction we could use Lindenbaum's Lemma to extend Thm(t) to a prime theory in Var(t) that is disjoint from . Moreover, if theories are required to be nonempty, then = ∅ and so is proper. Thus putting a = ( , Var(t)) would give a ∈ S and a ≥ t; and if A ∈ Thm(u) then ¬A ∈ and so ¬A / ∈ Thm(a), which implies that a ⊥ u. But this contradicts our original supposition. Hence indeed Thm(t) ∩ = ∅.
II(iii) : α ∪ (β − γ ) is a (nonempty) finite set of real variables if α, β, γ are.
IV(ii) (a):
Let t↓ ⊥ u↓. Then there is an A ∈ Thm(u↓) with ¬A ∈ Thm(t↓). Now A ∈ Thm(u) and ¬A ∈ Thm(t), as Thm(v↓) ⊆ Thm(v) in general, so t ⊥ u.
IV(ii) (b): Let t ⊥ u↑, with some B ∈ Thm(u↑) having ¬B ∈ Thm(t). By definition of u↑, there exists A ∈ Thm(u) with A L B. Hence ¬B L ¬A by Antitonicity, so ¬A ∈ Thm(t). But ¬A is a formula in Var(u) = Var(t↓), so ¬A ∈ Thm(t↓), implying t↓ ⊥ u.
V(v) : Let → be vw . Suppose t ⊥ u, with some B ∈ Thm( u) having ¬B ∈ Thm(t). Then there exists A ∈ Thm(u) with A L vw B. Hence ¬B L vw ¬A by Antitonicity. This ensures ¬A ∈ Thm( t ), and hence t ⊥ u.
V(vi) :
The new part is that t u ≤ − → tu . This uses the Fusion-Residuation rules, in the form of their consequences in Lemma 6.3(2). Let B ∈ Thm( t u ). Then there exists A → B ∈ Thm( t) with A ∈ Thm( u). Hence there exists C ∈ Thm(t) with C L vw A → B, and
But by T2 and C ∈ Thm(t) we have
Let Var(A) − Var(t↓) = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, and take new x 1 , . . . , x n not occurring in A or B.
But L A → A * by Lemma 4.1(1), and A ∈ Thm(t), so A * ∈ Thm(t). Since A * ∈ Fml(Var(t↓)), then A * ∈ Thm(t↓). Since A * L vw B, this finally gives B ∈ Thm( − − → (t↓)) as required.
Proof. We work through the new inductive cases for A. Suppose t = ( , V ). Negation: Let t | ¬B. Put = {C ∈ Fml(V ) : B L C}, and u = ( , V ). Then u ∈ T and u ≡ t. But B ∈ Thm(u) by the Identity axiom, so u | B by induction hypothesis, hence t ⊥ u by the semantics of ¬. Thus there is some C ∈ with ¬C ∈ Thm(t). By Antitonicity, ¬C L ¬B, hence ¬B ∈ Thm(t) as required.
Conversely, if ¬B ∈ Thm(t), then for any u ≡ t with u | B we have B ∈ Thm(u) by induction hypothesis, which is enough to show t ⊥ u. Hence t | ¬B.
Disjunction: Let t | B ∨ C. Now if B ∨ C / ∈ , then there exists a extending that is saturated in V and has B ∨ C / ∈ . Put a = ( , V ) ∈ S. Then a ≥ t, so either a | B or a | C, so by induction hypothesis B ∈ or C ∈ . But in either case the Disjunction Introduction axioms lead to the contradiction B ∨ C ∈ . Hence B ∨ C ∈ Thm(t) after all.
Conversely, if B ∨C ∈ Thm(t), then for any a ≥ t, B ∨C ∈ Thm(a), hence B ∈ Thm(a) or C ∈ Thm(a) as Thm(a) is prime, so a | B or a | C by induction hypothesis. This
Then a ≥ t, so the semantics of fusion gives some u, v with a ≥ uv, u | B, and v | C. Hence by induction hypothesis B ∈ Thm(u) and C ∈ Thm(v). By T2 of Lemma 6.3(2), B ∈ Thm(u) implies (C → B • C) ∈ Thm(u). Hence C ∈ Thm(v) implies B • C ∈ Thm(uv) ⊆ Thm(a) = , a contradiction. Hence B • C ∈ Thm(t) after all.
Conversely, let B • C ∈ Thm(t) and take any a ≥ t. Then B • C ∈ Thm(a). Put Thm(u) and C ∈ Thm(v), so u | B and v | C by induction hypothesis. It remains to show that a ≥ uv to conclude from this that t | B • C.
This leads by T1 of Lemma 6.3(2) to B • C L E. As B • C ∈ Thm(a), E ∈ Thm(a) as required.
Existential quantifier: Let t | ∃x B. If ∃x B / ∈ , there exists a V -saturated extending with ∃x B / ∈ . Put a = ( , V ) ∈ S. Then a ≥ t, so by the semantics for ∃ of Corollary 6.2(2), there exist u and v ∈ D u with u | B(v/x) and u↓ V ≤ a. By induction hypothesis B(v/x) ∈ Thm(u). Hence by the Existence axiom, ∃x B ∈ Thm(u). But ∃x B ∈ Fml(V ), so then ∃x B ∈ Thm(u↓ V ) ⊆ Thm(a) = , a contradiction. Hence ∃x B ∈ Thm(t) after all.
Conversely, let ∃x B ∈ Thm(t). Take any a ≥ t. Choose v / ∈ V and put
From ∃x B ∈ Thm(t) we then get C ∈ Thm(t) ⊆ Thm(a), so C ∈ Thm(a) as required.
In a canonical model, the semantics of fusion can be simplified: v (t ≥ uv and u | B and v | C) . Thm(t) by the Canonical Truth Lemma just proved. But in the Fusion case of this lemma we defined points u = ( B , V ) and v = ( C , V ) of the model with B ∈ Thm(u) and C ∈ Thm(v), and showed that if E ∈ Thm(uv), then B • C L E. Since B • C ∈ Thm(t), this implies that Thm(uv) ⊆ Thm(t), and hence t ≥ uv. Also u | B and v | C by the lemma.
Conversely, if t ≥ uv and u | B and v | C, then transitivity of ≥ ensures that (∀a ≥ t) (a ≥ uv and u | B and v | C), hence t | B • C.
We have now completed all the work needed for completeness theorems that axiomatize the logics determined by MQ-models. Theorem 6.4 and Lemmas 6.5 and 6.6, together with the work of the earlier sections allow us to conclude that MQ is characterized by the class of all MQ-models. This completeness result extends to MQX, where X is any subset of a list comprising the postulates of Figure 2 reader to show that each of these postulates is valid in models satisfying the corresponding condition, and that, conversely, a canonical model A L satisfies this condition if L has the postulate.
For all of these logics, completeness also holds for the extension obtained by adding Conjunctive ∃-Distribution and restricting to models satisfying IV(i)(d) (see Theorems 4.2 and 6.4(2)). Likewise for the addition of Disjunctive ∀-Distribution and IV(i)(b).
As is well known, the Double-Negation Introduction axiom is equivalent to the Contraposition rule over MQ. Indeed, only the Prefixing and Modus Ponens rules are needed to show the Contraposition rule is equivalent to the combination of the Antitonicity rule and the Double-Negation Introduction axiom. The formula analogues of these rules are equivalent over MQ in the presence of Double-Negation Introduction, as indicated by the conditions corresponding to the first three postulates above.
Identity again.
For validity of I4 in general we need a new model condition, since the validity proof we gave for it in Section 3 used the co-theory function −a, which has now been replaced by ⊥. The new condition is I. Standard:
For languages with a distinguished identity predicate ≈, we define an MQ-model with identity to be an MQ-model that satisfies VI(i) and also this I(ix). In such a model, we get t | i ≈ i → A for any A ∈ Sen(t). These facts allow us to establish that
• MQ ≈ , the smallest logic in the language with ≈ that has the identity axioms, is characterized by the class of all MQ-models with identity. REMARK 6.9 (THE PLACE OF I3 AND I4). The identity axiom I3:
is an instance of I1, and I3 follows from this by the second Fusion-Residuation rule. That works also in RQ, where the fusion connective is definable.
Remark 3.6 pointed out that I4 is not needed in logics containing the Assertion axiom A → (( A → B) → B) , which corresponds to the commutative model condition tu = ut. The logic characterized by the class of all commutative MQ-models with identity is axiomatizable by adding just I1 and I2 to MQ+Assertion. But whereas I4 was seen to be derivable from I1 over BQ+Assertion, this derivation used Double-Negation Elimination and does not carry through over MQ+Assertion. For logics with the weaker Antitone or Contrapositive Negation, inclusion of I4 requires the additional model condition I(ix). Inclusion of I4 is necessary for logics that lack Assertion. §7. Conservatively adding ≈. This section describes a proof that a predicate satisfying the main identity axioms I1 and I2 can be conservatively added to MQ−∃, the ∃-free fragment of MQ. The proof will also directly show the conservativity of adding ⊃ to this fragment, and to some of its extensions, including MQ−∃+Assertion.
We assume now that our language has the primitives τ τ τ , ∧, ∨, ¬, →, •, ∀; but not ∃. A logic L for this language has all the postulates of MQ except for those involving ∃. MQ−∃ is the smallest such logic.
The idea of the conservativity proof is to construct a characteristic algebraic model M L for L by the standard Lindenbaum method, and then embed this Lindenbaum algebra into its ideal completion M + L . This embedding preserves the interpretation of sentences, and gives an order-complete algebraic model falsifying the nontheorems of L. Self-identities are interpreted as the top element of the completion, and other identities as the bottom element. The order-completeness is used to interpret ∀x A, intuitively as the infinite conjunction of all its specifications A(i/x). This defines a model satisfying I1 and I2, and any further axioms whose truth is preserved by ideal completion. In addition M + L , as the ideal completion of a distributive lattice, is in fact a Heyting algebra, so it can be used to show the conservativity of adding ⊃. We spell out some details: DEFINITION 7.1. A basic algebra Q = (Q, ≤, , , ⇒, •, −, 1) comprises:
• A partial order ≤ on the set Q, making it into a distributive lattice with meet and join operations that will be used to interpret the connectives ∧ and ∨.
• Binary operations ⇒ and • on Q interpreting the connectives → and •. These satisfy:
• A unary operation − :
Given a set I (of individuals), as previously we add the members of I to our language as self-designating constants. A sentence is a formula that may contain these constants but has no free variables. An algebraic model M = (Q, I, θ) consists of a basic algebra Q, a nonempty set I of individuals, and a valuation θ , which is a function assigning to each sentence A an element θ A of Q, such that
where denotes meet (greatest lower bound). Note that we do not require that every subset of Q has a meet, but only that for θ to qualify as a valuation, every set of the form {θ(A(i/x)) : i ∈ I } must have a meet, and it must be equal to θ(∀x A). 
, where θ L (A) = |A| for each real formula A, viewed as a sentence in which each v from R is a self-designating name.
The proof that this θ L is a valuation is standard, but we review the condition for ∀. 
The ideal completion of Q L is the structure
defined as follows. Its members are the ideals of Q L , which will be denoted A, B. Recall that an ideal is a subset of Q L that is closed under binary joins a b and closed downward under the partial order ≤. Q + L contains the principal ideal ↓a = {b : b ≤ a} generated by each a ∈ Q. It is a complete lattice under the inclusion ordering ⊆, with the meet j∈J A j of a set of ideals being its intersection J A j , and the join given by j∈J A j = {↓(a 1 · · · a n ) : a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ J A j }. • θ + (v ≈ v) = Q L , the largest ideal of Q L .
• For v = w, θ + (v ≈ w) = ∅, the smallest ideal.
• For A an atomic sentence other than an identity, θ + (A) = ↓|A|.
• For the inductive cases, θ + (A) is defined by the conditions specifying that it is a valuation, that is θ + (A ∧ B) = θ + A ∩ θ + B, θ + (¬A) = −θ + A, and so forth. In particular θ + (∀x A) = v∈R θ + (A(v/x)).
Thus θ + is the unique valuation determined by the given values on atomic sentences. In this conservativity result, MQ−∃ can be replaced by a number of its extensions got by adding various postulates. All that is required for the proof is that validity of the postulate be preserved in passing from M L to M + L . In this way it can be shown that I1 and I2 can be conservatively added to MQ−∃ + X , where X is any subset of a list comprising the negation-free postulates of Figure 2 and the negation-related postulates of Figure 5 . Verification of this is left to the reader. Now it is well known that the ideal completion of a distributive lattice is a Heyting algebra (a result of M. H. Stone, see Birkhoff, 1967, p. 129) . Indeed in Q A ⊆ ↓a}, and this might be a proper superset of A. Also, it seems that M + L need not validate Disjunction ∀-Distribution, and that the map a → ↓a need not preserve existing joins, so the method cannot be applied to postulates for ∃ at all. There is another construction, the MacNeille completion of a lattice, that does preserve any existing joins and meets, but it does not preserve ∧∨-Distribution, so is unsuitable for the kind of logics we are discussing. §8. Summary. The semantic characterizations and conservativity results that have been proved in this paper can be catalogued as follows.
(1) In the language with primitives τ τ τ , ∧, ¬, →, ∀, and with ∨ and ∃ defined, let L be any of the logics BQX τ τ τ , defined by the postulates for BQ listed in Figure 1 , the τ τ τ -postulates (see Figure 4) , and any subset X of the postulates listed in Figure 2 . Let L ≈ be the expansion of L by an identity predicate having axioms I1-I4.
(a) L ≈ is characterized by the class of all stratified models that satisfy all the conditions corresponding to the postulates in X, the condition I(viii) for τ τ τ (see (2.2)), and the identity condition VI(i): i ≈ t j iff t = i j t. The most significant unanswered question concerns the conservativity of Heyting implication over the nonidentity logics BQX τ τ τ , especially RQ τ τ τ . Having shown that HBQX τ τ τ ≈ is a conservative extension of BQX τ τ τ ≈ , the question is reduced to the conservativity of adding identity: is BQX τ τ τ ≈ a conservative extension of BQX τ τ τ ? The solution may require new techniques, possibly a proof-theoretic analysis.
